Introduction
Two new zoonotic coronaviruses causing disease in humans Hui and Zumla 2015; Peiris et al. 2003; Yu et al. 2014 ) have been the focus of international attention for the past 14 years due to their epidemic potential;
(1) the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV) (Peiris et al. 2003) first discovered in China in 2001 which caused a major global epidemic of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS); and (2) the Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) first isolated from a patient who died of severe lower respiratory tract infection in Jeddah (Saudi Arabia) in June 2012 (Zaki et al. 2012 ). The disease has been named Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) and it has remained on the radar of global public health authorities because of recurrent nosocomial and community outbreaks, and its association with severe disease and high mortality rates Al-Abdallat et al. 2014; Memish et al. 2013a; Oboho et al. 2015; The WHO MERS-CoV Research Group 2013; Cotten et al. 2013a; Assiri et al. 2013b; Memish et al. 2013b; Azhar et al. 2014; Kim et al. 2015; Wang et al. 2015; ). Cases of MERS have been reported from all continents and have been linked with travel to the Middle East WHO 2015c 
Origin and Transmission of MERS-CoV
Several studies have sought to ascertain the natural reservoir of MERS-CoV. Studies on bat feces from Middle East, Africa and several European countries have reported CoV in Nycteris and Pipistrellus bats (Annan et al. 2013; Memish et al. 2013c ). From Saudi Arabia, over a thousand bat samples were tested and only one fragment of MERS-CoV was found in one Taphozous bat which was related to MERS-CoV isolated from humans (Memish et al. 2013c) . Several studies have subsequently indicated that MERS-CoV is a zoonotic virus and human infections have been associated with direct or indirect contact with infected dromedary camels (Reusken et al. 2013 Haagmans et al. 2014; Hemida et al. 2014; Meyer et al. 2014; Muller et al. 2014; Gossner et al. 2016 WHO (2012 WHO ( -2015 camels. The apparent rarity of MERS-CoV transmission from primary MERS cases apart from hospital settings indicates that the transmission potential and infectivity of such cases is low. The occasional sporadic occurrence of MERS-CoV infection in MERS cases who have any reported animal contact or exposure to MERS cases may be explained by low level infectivity of sub-clinical or asymptomatic cases of MERS-CoV infection (Lessler et al. 2016 ).
Natural History and Pathogenesis
The (Lu et al. 2013 ) that are widespread in the body but are primarily located in the lower respiratory tract and thus a typical case of MERS presents with fever, cough, and/or shortness of breath and pneumonia (detailed in Table 1 ). Severe illness can occur in both immunocompetent and immunocompromised host. In general with up to two separate targets and/or sequencing; or (b) virus isolation in tissue culture; or (c) serology on serum tested in a WHO collaborating center with established testing methods. Real-time reverse-transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (rRT-PCR) is used ISARIC and Public Health 2014; Corman et al. 2012 Corman et al. , 2014 for specimens collected from the respiratory tract of suspected cases. CDC recommends the collection of three specimen types, lower respiratory, upper respiratory and serum specimens, for testing using the MERS rRT-PCR assay Accurate laboratory molecular diagnostic tests are available (MERS CDC Laboratory testing for MERS-CoV 2016) using highly sensitive and specific Real-time reverse transcription (RT-PCR) assays targeting unique gene regions such as the upE region (gene region upstream to E gene). These assays have been used for viral load quantitation in studies on viral shedding patterns, optimization of treatment and infection control strategies. Serological tests have been developed for surveillance purposes although they require evaluation in field studies . 
Management of Mers Patients
The clinical management of patients with MERS is largely symptomatic and aimed to reduce the risk of most severe complications, such as secondary infections, and to support renal and respiratory function (Reviewed in Zumla et al. 2015a; WHO 2015b, c; Lessler et al. 2016; Rabozzi et al. 2012; ISARIC and Public Health England 2014; CDC 2016) . Seriously ill patients should receive intensive care. Moreover, the implementation of appropriate infection control measures as soon is possible, is critical for preventing spread of the infection especially in hospitals. Whilst a range of treatments (CDC 2016; WHO 2015b; de Wilde et al. 2013; Falzarano et al. 2013a, b; Chan et al. 2013; Omrani et al. 2014; Shalhoub et al. 2015; Zumla et al. 2016 ) may be useful (Table 2) , currently there are no specific treatments for MERS-CoV infections and no controlled randomized clinical trials of any therapeutic have been conducted to date. A whole range of treatments have been used empirically for serious cases of MERS but there is no solid evidence that any of them can improve the clinical outcome. A range of anti-MERS-CoV drugs and host-directed therapies are in the pipeline [61] ), properly designed, randomized, controlled clinical trials are required to be performed.
Infection Control and Transmission Risk
There have been several nosocomial outbreaks of MERS-CoV infection within Saudi Arabia Oboho et al. 2015; Memish et al. 2013b ). The largest nosocomial outbreak outside Saudi Arabia occurred in mid-2015 in the Republic of Korea (Petersen et al. 2015; Hui et al. 2015b; Zumla et al. 2015c; Kim et al. 2016b) where the index case was 68-year-old male from Korea who visited several Middle Eastern countries (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain and Qatar) and developed symptoms upon return to Korea and due to lack of isolation and patient consulting several hospitals, a major outbreak ensued involving several hospitals. Early recognition of MERS cases and rapid implementation of infection control guidance is necessary to prevent nosocomial outbreaks of MERS-CoV. Implementation of effective infection control measures at the first consideration of the diagnosis of MERS-CoV is crucial for prevention of MERS-CoV outbreaks. The first major nosocomial outbreak of MER-CoV in 2013 occurred at Al-Hasa, Saudi Arabia in four hospitals where 21 cases of hospital acquired MERS-CoV infection were confirmed by sequence analyses .
Global public health authorities guidelines (CDC 2016; WHO 2015b) recommend to use, whenever it is possible airborne infection control (Zumla et al. 2015d ). However this observation may reflect the lack of clinical awareness of MERS and that diagnosis and treatment of respiratory tract infections largely remains empiric, without laboratory confirmation. An estimated 10 million visitors from over 184 countries travel to Saudi Arabia to participate in Hajj pilgrimage, the mini-pilgrimage Umrah or during the month of Ramadan, the vast majority come from developing countries ). If MERS-CoV was a major public health risk, 4 years after its first discover one would have expected cases of MERS-CoV infection in pilgrims. There were no cases of MERS reported during the 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015 among Hajj pilgrimages (Waldron and Doherty 2015; Lessler et al. 2014) . It is possible that like SARS-CoV, MERS-CoV will die out with time. Conversely it is also possible that MERS-CoV will mutate and increase its transmission potential and the risk of MERS-CoV spreading globally remains. Coker and colleagues (Soliman et al. 2015) estimated the potential risk of MERS-CoV infection to pilgrims who visit Saudi Arabia from different regions of the world based on the most likely scenario using recent pilgrim numbers for sub-Saharan Africa. They predict that there will be at most ten returning pilgrims each year with MERS-CoV infections. As the recent Ebola Virus Disease epidemic in West Africa illustrates, African and Asian countries are vulnerable to a Korea-like MERS-CoV outbreak (Zumla et al. 2015e) .
A recent study published in Science by Sabir and colleagues (Sabir et al. 2016) found that at least five lineages of MERS-CoV are circulating in Saudi Arabian camels. These results suggest that multiple lineages of MERS-CoV have been co-circulating in Saudi Arabia confirming what was suspected before (Cotten et al. 2013b (Cotten et al. , 2014 . This is a pre-requisite for recombination to occur and it is no surprise that Sabir et al. identified at least six recombination events, showing that recombination is frequent in MERS-CoV. Of interest was that one lineage sequenced by Sabir et al (Sabir et al. 2016 ) was associated with the 2015 Riyadh nosocomial outbreak (Balkhy et al. 2016) , and the MERS-CoV sequenced from the Republic of Korean outbreak also had a recombinant origin. It's been suggested that the recombinant lineage originated between December 2013 and June 2014, and has rapidly become the predominant lineage in Saudi Arabian camels since November 2014.
MERS-CoV remains a major threat for global health. With recent outbreaks of Ebola virus and Zika virus a coordinated global response is needed to tackle emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases with epidemic potential (Zumla et al. 2015e; Petersen et al. 2016; Memish et al. 2014b) . Meanwhile there are critical knowledge gaps related to MERS-CoV which, require to be filled (The WHO MERS-CoV Research Group 2013; .
